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Abstract
This paper reports on an experimental test of the Principle of Optimality in dy-
namic decision problems. This Principle, which states that the decision-maker should
always choose the optimal decision at each stage of the decision problem, conditional
on behaving optimally thereafter, underlies many theories of optimal dynamic deci-
sion making, but is normally dicult to test empirically without knowledge of the
decision-maker's preference function. In the experiment reported here we use a new
experimental procedure to get round this diculty, which also enables us to shed
some light on the decision process that the decision-maker is using if he or she is not
using the Principle of Optimality - which appears to be the case in our experiments.
Keywords: dynamic decision making, backward induction, principle of optimality,
experiments, software.
JEL classications: C91, D81, D90.
1 Introduction
In the economics literature on dynamic decision making there are essentially two main
stories about how decision makers tackle dynamic decision problems: (1) that they use
backward induction combined with the Principle of Optimality; (2) that they convert the
original dynamic decision problem into a static strategy choice problem. Irrespective of
which procedure is used the decision-maker needs only to have preferences over static de-
cision problems: with (1) the decision maker works backwards solving each static decision
problem in turn (beginning with the nal one) and then using these solutions to reduce
earlier dynamic problems into static ones - through the elimination of future choices which
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are sub-optimal; with (2) the choice of a strategy is simply a static decision problem. If
the individual's preference function over static decision problems is known then one should
be able to infer which of these two procedures is being used from observations on actual
decisions - unless, of course, these static preferences are Expected Utility (EU) preferences
in which case the two procedures yield exactly the same decision rule in all situations
1
. If,
however, these static preferences are not known, then it becomes dicult - from observa-
tions on decisions alone - to infer which, if either, of these two procedures an individual is
using.
In general if the static preferences are not EU preferences then the two procedures will
yield dierent decisions. Procedure (1) is essentially (Belman's) Principle of Optimality;
thus if the decision maker uses procedure (2) and does not have EU preferences, then it
rather trivially follows that the decision maker is not using the Principle of Optimality -
which is not surprising since the decision maker is essentially using a static decision rule.
Whether this is rational is an interesting point. However it is not our major concern here.
What is our major concern is to try and discover whether or not people use the Principle
of Optimality, and, if not, whether they use procedure (2) or some other procedure.
As we have already noted, if we do not know the individual's static preferences we will
be unable to infer from observations on decisions alone whether the individual is using
procedure (1) or procedure (2) or indeed some other procedure. To do so we need some
additional information. Here we report on an experiment with a design which, in princi-
ple, gives us that extra information - by directly revealing the decision process that the
individual is using. The next section describes that experimental design.
2 Our Experimental Methodologyy
We are interested in studying decision processes in dynamic decision problems under risk
2
.
In order to make a decision problem under risk a dynamic one we need at least two decision
stages each followed by a move by nature. At each decision stage at least two alternatives
1
Indeed some economists would argue that this is an important property of EU preferences which lend
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In a certain world a dynamic decision problem can be trivially reduced to a static one.
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